By: Margaret Piatos
In March 2021, Adm. Philip Davidson, then commander of US Indo-Pacific Command, told the Senate that the Chinese threat to Taiwan was “manifest during this decade, in fact in the next six years.” The warning earned the nickname “Davidson window,” and it changed how Congress spent money. Two years later, CIA director William Burns revealed that Xi Jinping had instructed the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027. With 2027 only months away, Washington is counting down.
However, it is counting down to the wrong war.
Burns himself drew the crucial distinction that Xi’s order did not mean he had decided to invade in 2027. Rather, the date is a readiness goal tied to the PLA’s centennial, not an invasion timeline. Treating it as a deadline invites two mistakes: tunnel vision now and complacency later.
If January 2028 arrives without an invasion, skeptics will dismiss the warnings, and political support for deterrence may fade just as China’s capabilities keep growing. Burns warned that the risk of force grows further into this decade, not that it peaks in a single year.
The bigger problem is that a fixation on invasion obscures what Beijing is already doing. China is squeezing Taiwan and neighbors through “gray zone” tactics that stay right below the threshold of war. In December 2025, the PLA’s Justice Mission 2025 exercise sent up to 130 aircraft and warships toward the island, and for the first time Beijing said its drills were meant to deter outside intervention.
In February 2025, Taiwan’s coast guard detained a Chinese-linked cargo ship after an undersea cable to the Penghu Islands was cut. Beijing has also used trade as a weapon, suspending tariff breaks on 134 Taiwanese products in 2024, a move Taiwan’s presidential office called “classic Chinese economic coercion.”
This year shows why watching only for invasion signals is misleading. Analysts at the Heritage Foundation found that 2026 has brought a relative lull in coercive Chinese military activity around Taiwan.
Yet the pressure did not disappear, but changed. In June 2026, the Chinese Coast Guard ran a days-long “law enforcement" operation off of Taiwan’s coast, inspecting nearly 200 ships and patrolling areas containing undersea cables. A coast guard inspection such as this one rehearses how Beijing could quarantine and cut Taiwan off from the world.
That is the scenario Washington is least prepared for. US war planning naturally centers on stopping an invasion fleet. But a quarantine run by Coast Guard vessels, severed cables, and targeted trade restrictions would never present a clearer trigger than an invasion. Each step, though small, could together erode Taiwan’s economy and confidence in its partners without a single shot being fired.
However, we cannot disqualify the 2027 warning as it has focused attention, accelerated arms deliveries, and pushed Congress to fund deterrence in the Pacific. The answer is not to abandon that sense of urgency, but to redirect it.
Washington should plan for a Coast Guard quarantine, help Taiwan expand its coast guard, a priority President Lai Ching-te has already made, and invest in backup communications so a cut cable doesn't cut off the island. It should also work with partners on how they would respond to Chinese economic coercion.
Most of all, US officials should stop talking about Taiwan as if it were on a deadline. The contest over Taiwan will not end in 2027, and it may never take the form of a dramatic invasion. China does not need to storm Taiwan to win; it only needs Washington to keep watching the calendar while the pressure quietly tightens.