By: Alexander Macturk
Early this month, Chief National Security Correspondent for CNN Jim Sciutto reported that senior Biden administration officials began “prepping rigorously” for a potential Russian nuclear strike in Ukraine. Sciutto’s report mirrors the unsettling trend of states with nuclear arsenals levying similar threats. North Korea’s Kim Jong Un welcomed the New Year with an order to “thoroughly annihilate” the United States and South Korea if attacked. Iran’s technological advancements have lowered the development time required to weaponize its nuclear research. Coupled with the instability in the region, prompted by the October 7 Hamas terrorist attack, Iran is worryingly poised to build its nuclear stockpile.
Despite this, the validity of such threats and likelihood of nuclear proliferation remain unclear. Nonetheless, the U.S has exited its post-Cold War bliss and reentered a new period where nuclear deterrence is no longer a theoretical strategic issue. In fact, the risk of use of nuclear weapons in combat is rising. Therefore, the national security community requires a strict reexamination of the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, its application in the post-Cold War world, and a path forward.
For the U.S, the way to address nuclear deterrence varies between military and political leaders. Admiral Charles Richard, former Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, has stressed American policymakers’ retreat from their myopia and sober realization that nuclear deterrence has always been integral to strategic deterrence. He emphasizes that nuclear deterrence itself has never been a universal deterrent. In fact, leaders such as Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev vigorously competed with each other for unilateral gain under the umbrella of nuclear deterrence.
Failure to fully understand nuclear deterrence may lead to dangerous consequences. Nuclear weapons can inflict “uncontestable costs,” including an all-out nuclear assault. Nevertheless, nuclear deterrence does not exist separately from conventional deterrence. On a similar note, Sciutto also reported executive branch officials’ concerns that Russia may employ a “tactical or battlefield nuclear weapon.” The possibility of Vladimir Putin deploying tactical nuclear arms underlines the important duty of policymakers to prepare for any battlefield possibility and disregard the practice of solely relying on nuclear deterrence for international stability.
The poor application and stunted understanding of nuclear deterrence has evolved from the bipolar power struggle between the U.S. and Soviet Union. Admiral Richard has saliently warned that the twenty-first century authoritarian nuclear regimes may now stake their legitimacy on the ability to wage nuclear war. For example, North Korea passed a law in 2022 that explicitly states its status as a nuclear power. Authoritarian regimes do not employ traditional nuclear deterrence to persuade a potential adversary that the costs of a retaliatory nuclear attack far outweigh the benefits of an initial strike. In fact—and reflected in the language of the 2022 North Korea law—these authoritarian regimes misconstrue their nuclear arsenals not as a deterrent but as a strategic tool for “taking the initiative in war” and securing the continued viability of their regimes.
To address this uncomfortable and present reality posed by the nuclear proliferation since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. must remain committed to international diplomacy aimed at limiting the development of nuclear arsenals. The U.S. must also push reduction treaties, like New START between the U.S. and Russia, as better alternatives to nuclear deterrence. Looking ahead, the U.S. should also work to lower tensions on the Korean Peninsula to ensure that Kim’s 2022 nuclear declaratory law has no chance of being practiced. If committed to pursuing renewed and reinvigorated commitment to nuclear proliferation and reducing tensions in conflicts involving nuclear powers, the U.S. would bring stability and international security and help make nuclear displays irrelevant on the global stage.
