By: Aidan Stern
In 1975, the World Bank published a report about Lesotho, a land-locked, enclave nation completely surrounded by South Africa. The bank called the country a traditional subsistence economy, devoid of modern economic development. Rapid population growth, deteriorating agricultural production, and underdeveloped industries in Lesotho forced most laborers to migrate to South Africa for work in mines to support their families.
Fitting traditional justifications for economic intervention, development agencies working in Lesotho gained $64 million in official assistance to address the plight of the Basotho people, aLesotho ethnic group. At the time, the money amounted to $49 for every person – man, woman, or child – living in Lesotho. Development initiatives rushed to establish a cash economy and build infrastructures like roads, fenced areas, and administrative hubs in rural communities to develop a cattle industry and accumulate credit.
Despite what seemed to be the case on paper, three years into the project, a development office had been burned down and the Canadian Officer in charge of the program was fearing for his life. In the end, the aid organizations’ projects, co-opted by the ruling Basotho National Party, were used as propaganda and manipulated to centralize the state, exerting increased control over rural areas of the country. So, what went wrong?
The aid agencies failed to articulate actual conditions in Lesotho, instead focusing on a crisis narrative. The World Bank report ran contrary to many historical conditions and practices in Lesotho. They had a long history of stockpiling and exporting crops and livestock to South Africa. Further, labor migration was not an indicator of economic stress, but rather a long-established practice, where the Basotho acted as a labor reservoir for South African mines, farms, and industry. In turn, Basothos used earnings to purchase livestock to rear and sell when they could no longer work in the physically intensive South African industries. A farming economy didn’t materialize in the area because earlier encroachments of white settlers drove Basotho people into less productive land, creating dependence on a migratory economy.
However, Ferguson and Lohmann debunked this narrative in their book The Anti-Politics Machine. In their terms, the international development apparatus, including the World Bank and aid agencies, “[rearranged] reality” to address problems that fit into a narrative of modern development. In doing so, the apparatus ignored the context of Lesotho’s economy and politics by shifting the problem to a purely technical standpoint. Problems became centered around solutions like developing an export based livestock economy, which clashed with long-term local conceptions of livestock as a measure of wealth and investment. The mass production of livestock and privatization of public lands would lead to overgrazing and the degradation of the land that hurts pastoralists in the long run.
Additionally, development agencies failed to realize the political context of their development efforts by solely focusing on the government as a tool for the administration of their projects. This failure led to the expansion of a bureaucratic government equipped with better infrastructure and more resources that enabled them to prevent democratic activism and gain control over local functions.
It is important to note that foreign aid has come a long way since the 1970s, but still has a long way to go. Solutions rely on community involvement and empowerment. Initiatives like Africa’s Great Green Wall, a massive water fixation project spanning from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea to combat the expansion of the Sahara Desert, are great examples of projects which show improvements and lingering challenges with aid implementation. The project is highly ambitious, under-financed, diluted with government grift, and plagued with conflicts that prevent communities from working to replenish their land against desertification. However, there are plenty of agents facilitating conflict resolution, negotiating deals on grazing rights for pastoralists and protections for farmers among project sites. Furthermore, the UN has worked alongside the government of Chad, a partner nation in the project, to solve refugee crises by integrating refugees and host communities through joint efforts to build water harvesting structures. By focusing on the smaller project sites within the massive scale of the Great Green Wall, workers have found success enabling local communities. Luckily, the development community has been moving in the right direction, and stories of community empowerment are becoming more mainstream.
In the future, the UN and other development agencies must focus on stories of problem-solving, trust-building, and communal facilitation. True success in these initiatives originates in the people who become empowered to change their homes on their terms. As students at the University of Virginia, or anyone that reads the Virginia Journal, we have the opportunity to demand more of the organizations that work to better our and others’ lives. The first step in this is educating yourself about effective action and holding the organizations you help to a greater standard.
