By Ben Gustafson
In 2016, the Colombian government led by Juan Manuel Santos unveiled a groundbreaking peace agreement with Colombia’s largest rebel group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (known as the FARC). With the agreement, the government hoped to end the longest-running armed conflict in the Western Hemisphere, which displaced millions and left at least 220,000 dead. However, Colombians quickly realized that creating the agreement was the easy part. Implementing proved to be much more difficult.
In many ways, the government failed to keep their side of the bargain. First, the government promised to rectify the economic inequality that has plagued the Colombian countryside since the FARC’s inception. The government planned to redistribute land, ensure property rights within a new rural legal system, and inject the countryside with massive infrastructure projects. Yet according to New York Times reporter Nicholas Casey, millions of Colombians still await the promised arrival of roads, schools and electricity.
Additionally, the government guaranteed victims adequate financial reparations and an end to the conflict. As of 2019, the government had only provided reparations to only 10% of the more than 8.8 million victims, according to a Brookings Institution report. Casey reports that since the peace deal was signed, at least 500 activists and community leaders have been killed, and more than 210,000 people displaced from their homes amid the continuing violence.
The problem is partly political will. Many Colombians saw the agreement as a capitulation to the FARC, resulting in the election of conservative President Ivan Duque. However, even Duque would like to implement rural reform, the first and most important issue in the agreement. In fact, according to Emilio Archila, High Presidential Councilor for Stabilization and Consolidation, Duque has allocated 150 million dollars for a multipurpose land registry and presented legislation to address irrigation issues in rural areas.
Implementing the peace agreement is not so much a political problem as it is an economic problem. Archila said it best, “it all comes down to one word: money. The issue is not the lack of will, but the lack of resources.” Point one of the agreement, rural reform, represents 85% of all implementation costs, and the government simply does not have the resources. Colombia’s government is $25 billion short, according to newspaper El Tiempo.
Thus, before the government can focus on implementation, the government must figure out how to pay for it. The first solution that comes to mind is deficit spending. However, if the government decides to spend money it doesn’t have, it must carefully evaluate the economic consequences. There’s a possibility that deficit spending could hurt the economy, leaving the prospects of successful implementation of the agreement even worse.
The government must find creative solutions to its fiscal dilemma. They could start by looking at what is already working in the Colombian countryside. One industry that seems to be doing something right is the cocaine industry. In 2017, despite the government’s efforts at forced eradication and crop-substitution programs, coca production soared to an all-time high, according to the Economist. One reason is many areas lack quality roads necessary to transport crops. Without roads, the only option many farmers have is to cultivate coca because they can turn an acre of coca leaves into a few kilograms of cocaine paste, which can be carried into town in a backpack.
One potential solution to Colombia’s financial problem is to legalize coca production for lawful uses. A report published by the US-based Open Society Foundation details the potential application of coca in nutrition, natural medicine, personal care, and agro-industry. According to freelance journalist Lucy Sheriff, coca fertilizers were found by the researchers to be a low-cost, high-nutrient technology. The report identifies Peru and Bolivia as examples of how coca legislation can be successfully implemented. If Colombia followed suit, they would no longer need to spend millions of coca eradication and crop-substitution. Additionally, the new tax revenue could help pay for rural infrastructure.
However, many have their doubts about legalizing coca products. For example, Ana María Rueda, an adviser to Colombia’s drug policy director, says there’s no market for coca products. Rueda also mentions that if the government legalized coca, it would need to be able to regulate the coca market. Without a significant state presence in the countryside, effective regulation would be very difficult. Thus, the problem comes back to state capacity and the government’s ability to fund rural infrastructure.
In a perfect world, Colombia should not have over-promised, but here we are. Above all else, Colombia must focus on raising money for its comprehensive rural reform. The government will likely need to look to innovative solutions, like promoting alternative uses for the coca leaf. Ultimately, peace will not last long if the government continues on its present course.
