By: Céleste Wetmore
Following American-Israeli strikes on Iran on February 28, 2026, Americans and Iranians alike applauded the death of authoritarian Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who died alongside top Iranian security officials. Many were hopeful that the elimination of Khamenei and decapitation of his regime would create an opportunity for Iranians to seize control of their government and cultivate a new era, with one Iranian American celebrating the “beheading of the snake.” One month following the decisive move, Iran is no closer to a democracy.
The lack of a democratic surge following Operation Epic Fury and subsequent American efforts reflects a disconnect between intention, strategy, and outcome. If the American objective in Iran is indeed regime change, then the U.S. must address internal and external blockades to support Iranian civilians and meaningfully enable political shifts.
A revolution requires a viable environment. Threats to Iranian infrastructure are a key driver of domestic instability that could suppress political action, yet such intimidation has been at the center of the conflict and only exacerbated since the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Economic pressures on the American and global market have distracted from stated political objectives at the start of the war, including President Trump’s early-on call for Iranians to “take over” their government — encouragement met with threats from Iran’s Police Chief, who vowed to treat protestors as enemies.
Recalibration is needed amid this political and economic chaos. To deliver on American enablement of a government takeover in Iran, key decisionmakers must distinguish between waging war against Iran’s regime and creating an environment conducive to public action. This means a tactical focus on government capabilities while avoiding attacks on public energy infrastructure that create enduring domestic distress. The ongoing war in Ukraine explicitly demonstrates the crippling effects of assaults on public infrastructure.
In November of 2025, Russian attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure stoked chaos across the country, introducing severe hardship to civilian life. Similar conditions in Iran would almost certainly pivot any Iranian focus on revolution to the issue of survival. However, recent threats to bomb Iran’s bridges and energy, oil, and water infrastructure exemplify the heightened potential for a humanitarian crisis that would preclude civilian-led government change and directly undermine the survival of the civilian population. As objectives shift and the war presses on, facilitating regime change is likely to fall on the list of priorities. While the U.S. would certainly benefit from a non-authoritarian regime in Iran, it is responsible not for establishing one but for sparing the Iranian people from feeling the brunt of military aggression. Regardless of American action, a legitimate regime change can only come from the people.
Even if Iranians are sufficiently emboldened to confront a sufficiently weakened government, external conditions within the broader region could still obstruct the development of a democracy. Furthermore, anti-American non-state actors could take advantage of the intermediary power void. Two scenarios are likely if the regime successfully falls: the resulting power vacuum pushes Iran into civil war, reminiscent of 2003 Iraq after the American decapitation of Saddam Hussein, or an equally anti-American Iranian regime inserts itself with the help of regional partners.
To prevent this, the U.S. must scramble and deter Hezbollah and the Houthis, traditional partners of the Iranian regime and members of Iran’s Axis of Resistance. Even with Khamenei’s regime neutralized, these actors could obstruct or directly attack civilian efforts.
The U.S. is still in the position to make key strategic pivots to empower Iranian civilians to “take” their government. However, critics question whether American involvement is in anyone’s best interest. While some scholars champion the fall of Libya’s dictator Muammar al-Qaddafi and his regime as a humanitarian success facilitated by NATO, critics argue that NATO involvement prolonged the conflict and magnified the death toll. Since that fateful intervention in 2011, Libya has undergone a period of severe political instability and currently operates under a precarious dual-government system.
At the least, American strategy must ensure that the tactical dismantling of the current regime does not create a terminal impediment to the emergence of a successor state. A viable transition requires a measured policy that safeguards public infrastructure and neutralizes regional disruptors while weakening the remnants of Khamenei's dictatorial regime. Ultimately, a stable Iranian state cannot be built upon physical, economic, and social wreckage.
