HOW WILL COLOMBIA PAY FOR ITS PEACE AGREEMENT?

By Ben Gustafson

In 2016, the Colombian government led by Juan Manuel Santos unveiled a groundbreaking peace agreement with Colombia’s largest rebel group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (known as the FARC). With the agreement, the government hoped to end the longest-running armed conflict in the Western Hemisphere, which displaced millions and left at least 220,000 dead. However, Colombians quickly realized that creating the agreement was the easy part. Implementing proved to be much more difficult.

In many ways, the government failed to keep their side of the bargain. First, the government promised to rectify the economic inequality that has plagued the Colombian countryside since the FARC’s inception. The government planned to redistribute land, ensure property rights within a new rural legal system, and inject the countryside with massive infrastructure projects. Yet according to New York Times reporter Nicholas Casey, millions of Colombians still await the promised arrival of roads, schools and electricity.

Additionally, the government guaranteed victims adequate financial reparations and an end to the conflict. As of 2019, the government had only provided reparations to only 10% of the more than 8.8 million victims, according to a Brookings Institution report. Casey reports that since the peace deal was signed, at least 500 activists and community leaders have been killed, and more than 210,000 people displaced from their homes amid the continuing violence.

The problem is partly political will. Many Colombians saw the agreement as a capitulation to the FARC, resulting in the election of conservative President Ivan Duque. However, even Duque would like to implement rural reform, the first and most important issue in the agreement. In fact, according to Emilio Archila, High Presidential Councilor for Stabilization and Consolidation, Duque has allocated 150 million dollars for a multipurpose land registry and presented legislation to address irrigation issues in rural areas.

Implementing the peace agreement is not so much a political problem as it is an economic problem. Archila said it best, “it all comes down to one word: money. The issue is not the lack of will, but the lack of resources.” Point one of the agreement, rural reform, represents 85% of all implementation costs, and the government simply does not have the resources. Colombia’s government is $25 billion short, according to newspaper El Tiempo.

Thus, before the government can focus on implementation, the government must figure out how to pay for it. The first solution that comes to mind is deficit spending. However, if the government decides to spend money it doesn’t have, it must carefully evaluate the economic consequences. There’s a possibility that deficit spending could hurt the economy, leaving the prospects of successful implementation of the agreement even worse.

The government must find creative solutions to its fiscal dilemma. They could start by looking at what is already working in the Colombian countryside. One industry that seems to be doing something right is the cocaine industry. In 2017, despite the government’s efforts at forced eradication and crop-substitution programs, coca production soared to an all-time high, according to the Economist. One reason is many areas lack quality roads necessary to transport crops. Without roads, the only option many farmers have is to cultivate coca because they can turn an acre of coca leaves into a few kilograms of cocaine paste, which can be carried into town in a backpack.

One potential solution to Colombia’s financial problem is to legalize coca production for lawful uses. A report published by the US-based Open Society Foundation details the potential application of coca in nutrition, natural medicine, personal care, and agro-industry. According to freelance journalist Lucy Sheriff, coca fertilizers were found by the researchers to be a low-cost, high-nutrient technology. The report identifies Peru and Bolivia as examples of how coca legislation can be successfully implemented. If Colombia followed suit, they would no longer need to spend millions of coca eradication and crop-substitution. Additionally, the new tax revenue could help pay for rural infrastructure.

However, many have their doubts about legalizing coca products. For example, Ana María Rueda, an adviser to Colombia’s drug policy director, says there’s no market for coca products. Rueda also mentions that if the government legalized coca, it would need to be able to regulate the coca market. Without a significant state presence in the countryside, effective regulation would be very difficult. Thus, the problem comes back to state capacity and the government’s ability to fund rural infrastructure.

In a perfect world, Colombia should not have over-promised, but here we are. Above all else, Colombia must focus on raising money for its comprehensive rural reform. The government will likely need to look to innovative solutions, like promoting alternative uses for the coca leaf. Ultimately, peace will not last long if the government continues on its present course.

THE CONTINUING IMPRISONMENT OF MUSLIM UYGHURS IN CHINA

By Griffin Asnis

In what is possibly the largest contemporary mass incarceration of a minority population in the world, over one million Muslims are reportedly detained in internment camps in China’s western region of Xinjiang, where the Muslim Uyghur population totals 12 million. Some speculate—including Dolkun Isa, president of the World Uyghur Congress—that as many as two million Muslims are currently imprisoned, based on information provided by released prisoners. Nevertheless, the relative silence of the international community regarding China’s cultural genocide is stunning.

Chinese government officials initially denied the processes of forced assimilation and acculturation, which had begun in earnest under the government of President Xi Jinping. Yet—in light of mounting pressure from the international community, government officials have acknowledged the existence of such camps, though they regard these institutions as centers for learning, offering educational and vocational training to Muslim ethnic minorities. Known euphemistically as re-education schools, these clandestine facilities are purported to counter Islamic extremism through the cultivation of vocational skills as well as training in the Chinese language. Falling well short of education, however, the camps’ inhumane methods of indoctrination signify a blatant, and systematic, attempt to ethnically cleanse the minority Uyghur population.

Accumulating evidence from individual accounts, satellite imagery, and leaked official documents provide limited insight into Xinjiang’s sprawling network of re-education camps. Satellite images have captured footage of ongoing, large-scale camp construction. Images of the camps from above depict large prison-like structures, looming watchtowers, and razor wire fences. Various accounts of physical and psychological torture—even death—from former detainees reveal a horrifying reality within the walls of the detention centers.

Prisoners are detained with neither the aid of an attorney nor a trial for months and, in some cases, years, as they are compelled to renounce their religious affiliations and assert steadfast allegiance to the Communist Party. Detainees are often subjected to continuous brainwashing with Communist propaganda and coerced into memorizing and reciting political songs. Because police forces effectively thwart access to the camps and closely surveil foreign journalists who travel to Xinjiang, independent accounts from detainees are increasingly rare.  

The Chinese government’s reach extends well beyond the perimeters of its internment camps, however. Within the Xinjiang province, Muslims are consistently exposed to ethnic profiling as well as encumbering travel restrictions. During Lunar Year celebrations, authorities in the region have reportedly forced Muslims to consume pork and alcohol. Several draconian laws forbid parents from selecting certain names like Mohammed for their babies, and even ban long beards and headscarves, too. In fact, these institutionalized forms of cultural persecution are reflective of a broader mission to cleanse Muslim minorities of their distinct culture—one which has transpired over many years. What’s more, a system of forced labor is emerging from these internment camps in western China, in which minorities are forced to accept jobs at newly constructed textile factories for free or at a low cost. In this case, it seems the Chinese state’s ostensible goal to re-educate its Muslim inhabitants is not as much an attempt to thwart Islamic terrorism as it is an endeavor to forcibly assimilate a significant minority population into a Chinese-speaking, industrial workforce.

The Chinese government must be held accountable for its egregious violations of human rights by the international community, and its unjust practices must be unequivocally condemned. To remain silent is to trivialize a moral travesty.

WHAT CAN U.S. AID REALLY DO IN THE NORTHERN TRIANGLE?

By Anna Bickley

More than 100,000 asylum-seekers—the highest number in more than a decade—reached the United States’ southern border in March 2019. Many came from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras—known also as the Northern Triangle of Central America—to escape violence and limited economic opportunity. 

However, this influx of refugees does not seem to be reflected in American policy. The United States plans to admit a maximum of 18,000 refugees in 2020—the lowest number admitted since 1980—under strict new admissions ceilings set by the current presidential administration. Additionally, the current administration has slashed aid in Central America, much of which was intended for the Northern Triangle, from nearly $700 million to $530 million with plans to decrease further in the coming years. 

At the moment, many of the most dire problems facing the citizens of the Northern Triangle— especially gang violence, crime, struggling educational systems, national disasters, and limited economic opportunity—can be traced back to the government’s lack of necessary resources to deal with these issues. In 2013, the attorney general of Honduras stated that his office only had the resources to investigate one-fifth of all homicide cases in the country with the highest murder rate in the world. Honduras and the other nations in the Northern Triangle need funds to deal with the pervasive issues that are driving people to seek asylum in other countries; however, they are severely lacking in the institutional capacity to gather such funds. 

Due to frequent tax evasion in the Northern Triangle, only an estimated 70 percent of wage-earners in Guatemala and one-third in El Salvador pay any personal income tax. Tax collection rates in the Northern Triangle are among the lowest in the world with Honduras’ tax revenue at 19 percent of GDP, El Salvador’s at 16 percent, and Guatemala’s at merely 10.3 percent. 

Targeted aid has helped to improve tax collection in the past. In 2004, USAID partnered with the Salvadoran government to improve El Salvador’s revenue collection capacity and audit systems at the national tax collection agency. The $10 million investment helped El Salvador to raise an additional $1.5 billion in taxes without increasing tax rates. Similar investments could drastically increase the capacity of Northern Triangle governments to solve many of the social and political issues that push people to flee to the U.S. in the first place.

However, increased revenue would be ineffective against government corruption. Northern Triangle governments continually rank among the world’s most corrupt—in all three nations, former presidents are currently serving prison sentences. Corruption costs Honduras an estimated $367 million a year, or 4.3% of GDP, and El Salvador approximately lost $550 million to corruption in 2015 alone.

Some recent anti-corruption initiatives have had positive outcomes. Guatemala's UN-backed International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) was established in 2006 to prosecute corruption cases. Within three years of its founding, impunity levels for serious crimes dropped from 95 to 72 percent with homicide rates steadily falling ever since. In 2015, CICIG’s investigations led to the arrest of Guatemala’s sitting president Otto Pérez Molina who is currently awaiting trial for corruption. Historically, the U.S. Congress contributed about a third of CICIG’s $18 million annual budget. 

Finally, many are driven from their homes in search of greater economic opportunities abroad. In part due to the lack of tax revenue and the abundance of government corruption, the economies of the countries in the Northern Triangle are often stagnant and lacking in opportunity. Aid has proven to be successful in the past, especially in Guatemala wherein 2013 USAID agricultural programming helped increase rural farmers’ sales and created 20,000 new jobs in agriculture.

Though it is unrealistic to expect Congress to funnel infinite aid into the Northern Triangle and see results, it seems counterproductive to slash aid in the region given its historical success and importance. Instead, a strategy to address the root of the crisis in the Northern Triangle is more vital than ever before. A plan which would include domestic initiatives to strengthen porous tax regimes and combat corruption could be a major game-changer for many citizens who desperately wish to stay in their country but cannot due to these issues.