How Nagorno-Karabakh Undermines Western Justifications in Ukraine

By: Danial Butt

The Republic of Artsakh, better known by its Russian name of Nagorno-Karabakh, is a piece of land in the Caucasus that has been disputed by Armenia and Azerbaijan for decades. The vast majority of Nagorno-Karabakh’s population is Armenian, and its people were effectively operating as their own state, wholly autonomous from their neighbors. Due to Soviet imperialist policies, it was considered part of its Azerbaijan region instead of Armenia with arbitrary border lines comparable to that of colonialist regimes. When the Soviet Union collapsed, Nagorno-Karabakh was then recognized by the rest of the world as part of the modern day independent Azerbaijan. But mere recognition in itself is not a legally binding way to determine land claims. Nagorno-Karabakh itself seceded from the Soviet Union to form its own republic in 1991. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan not only claimed the territory for itself but has also been rewriting its history to claim that Armenians are not indigenous to the region but are invaders that need to be expelled. 

Sound familiar? Like Ukraine, Nagorno-Karabakh is a key region in Eastern Europe that is being disputed under the same tactics of historical revisionism and blatant disregard for international laws. While the Western world has very much been invested into the War in Ukraine over the past few years, it has comparatively been uninvolved in protecting the people of Nagorno-Karabakh. Within the past year, Azerbaijan’s offensive effectively expelled over ninety nine percent of the native Armenian population from Nagorno-Karabakh. Various global organizations have labeled this catastrophe as a genocide, perpetuating the legitimacy of “might makes right” policies. Conversely, Western leadership itself has largely ignored if not exacerbated the conflict, selling weapons to the region for decades instead of properly negotiating peace between any of the countries involved. Such actions expose the hypocrisy of the so-called democratic powers, showing how they are only fixated on protecting human rights when they have to protect their own interests.

While the UN offices in Azerbaijan have reported that over 100,000 people fled Nagorno-Karabakh, they also reported that they “saw no damage” present in their investigations. But such claims have been disputed. Notably, Azerbaijan was criticized for obstructing UNESCO investigations into Nagorno-Karabakh. If they truly did “[see] no damage”, then it begs the question: why would Azerbaijan act as if there is anything to hide? With Azerbaijan’s long standing policies of declaring Nagorno-Karabakh as for themselves, there is no doubt that Azerbaijan will take the opportunity to tear down any evidence of Armenian ties to the land.

While it still operated as its own country, Nagorno-Karabakh itself had been relatively prosperous. For example, Nagorno-Karabakh had higher annual wages than Azerbaijan. Unfortunately, it is nigh impossible for such conditions to continue in the region, as Azerbaijan operates under authoritarian rule without free and fair elections. One may have expected Armenia’s ally in Russia to protect their interests and fellow people in Nagorno-Karabakh, but Russian fears of a democracy growing on their doorstep rendered this impossible as Armenian politics have recently transitioned towards Western democracy. Moreover, Russia has instead been galvanizing their diplomatic ties with Azerbaijan and Turkey. Both of these countries have been attempting to take control of the Zangezur Corridor, which goes through Armenia’s Syunik province. The loss of this land would hinder Armenia’s sovereignty even further if not entirely. But even without ownership of the corridor being settled, Armenia has alarmingly been referring to Azerbaijan’s escalating attacks on their borders as a sign of war to come.

It would of course be in the West’s best interest to aid Armenia and the refugees from Nagorno-Karabakh now, but there is a worrying problem that it is too little too late. Ethnic cleansing in Nagorno-Karabakh has already been accomplished with Russia and arguably even UN offices turning a blind eye to it. Continuing to recognize Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan instead of its own country not only served to legitimize the annexation but has effectively signaled that Armenia proper is now ripe for the taking. By this very logic, Palestine and Taiwan can freely be annexed as well as they are not recognized either. Much of Palestine has already been displaced while Taiwan is still in a precarious situation. And of course, Ukraine itself is still in imminent threat of being taken over. Even if Russia does not succeed now, it has already been proven that the West cares about protecting democracy as much as Russia cares about Armenia.

The Dangers of Tunnel Vision: Parsing Taiwanese Democratic Choice

By: Anna Murray

On January 13th, 2024, the Taiwanese public elected Lai Ching-te to serve as their next president, marking the first time in history that the incumbent party in Taiwan has claimed victory with two subsequent different candidates. The victor’s party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), gained international recognition for being the least favorite option for the People’s Republic of China. Lai Ching-te has long expressed intent to strengthen economic relations with the US, continuing efforts made by previous president Tsai Ing-wen to wean Taiwan off of economic dependence on China and establish significant trade relations with regional partners in Southeast Asia and across the Pacific in Europe and the US. Americans concerned with cross-strait affairs felt an overall sense of relief that the Taiwanese public had favored the DPP over the Kuomintang, which on the whole favored better economic relations with the Chinese mainland. 

However, most international observers were surprised by the relative lack of focus on China within this Taiwanese election cycle. Polls and surveys showed that the vast majority of younger and middle-aged Taiwanese voters focused on domestic issues in this election: inflation and job insecurity, housing shortages and wages. At the end of the day, the DPP offered the public a domestic policy package that exceeded the competitors’. To an America that only ever sees Taiwan in the context of the cross-strait conflict, this reality is almost unbelievable. To the average Taiwanese voter, the visible shift to domestic issues is a long time coming.

The first undeniable fact is that the Taiwanese position on China, at least since the advent of the 21st century, has rarely changed. Most Taiwanese individuals highly value the status quo; they do not wish to replicate the “one country, two systems” situation that plagues Hong Kong, but they also do not want the violence and uncertainty that would come with declaring independence. Previous President Tsai Ing-wen faced scalding criticism over her prioritization of independence from China, so much so that Lai Ching-te doubled down on reducing cross-strait tensions as much as possible during his 2024 electoral campaign. Seen time and time again, any politician that attempts to move beyond this status quo is almost immediately discredited in the eyes of the average Taiwanese voter; sharp changes in strategy must invariably be avoided at all costs. As such, in the grand scheme of things, the actual China strategy of the DPP candidate does not vary all that much from the KMT candidate.

Perhaps more importantly, the Taiwanese people are tired of talking about China. For a country that has been talking about and contending with the threat of the PRC for the better half of a century, the fear and uncertainty are commonplace. A professor of mine in Taiwan cautioned us almost immediately against asking locals about the cross-strait issue; though Americans start a discussion on Taiwan with the PRC, it is taboo to discuss on the island itself. The US has only recently reopened the conversation on Taiwan because of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and its implications, but cross-strait relations remained a preoccupation over decades in Taiwan. The China threat is thus a sunk cost in Taiwanese elections; if you’re going to be a politician in Taiwan in this day and age, you must have something else to bring to the table. 

What is left is an intense pride for the type of miracle democracy that Taiwan is; founded out of the ashes of a dictatorship under Chiang Kai-shek and weathered through menacing PLA navy ships at its borders, Taiwanese public participation is as unshakable as ever. It was not until recently that the vast majority of Taiwanese individuals began to identify primarily as Taiwanese; regardless, this individualism has become a crucial part of civic participation and perception of government’s responsibility. Put simply, Taiwanese voters see that there is a lot to Taiwan’s name that does not include the cross-strait crisis, and they expect their government to respond. 

While the DPP may favor economic relations with the United States more than China, it is likely the case that China will not base its decision to act on Taiwan on the outcomes of their elections. No Taiwanese party would wholeheartedly hand the island over to the mainland, and Taiwanese industry is already too dependent on China to make a difference one way or the other. Most past attempts to diversify trading partners have faced extreme difficulty due to Chinese sanctions and diplomatic actions; this is a fact that would likely not alter by administration either. In the end, the Taiwanese story will depend on the Chinese willingness to move from threats to action, and this period of uncertainty could span from tomorrow to never. In the meantime, Taiwan can fight by maintaining a well-coordinated democracy, a strong domestic economy and production capacity, and a steady stream of visiting tourists, students, and dignitaries to drum up support. As a result, domestic policy in the coming years will be more crucial than ever, a conviction this election proves beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Summer 2023 Crisis in Kosovo and International Response

By: Brooke Blosser

Tensions between Kosovo and Serbia have been a long standing reality of the Balkan Peninsula. In the twenty years since the breakup of Yugoslavia, relations have continued to be unstable, often with violent flare ups between the two countries. Tensions remain high because Kosovo used to be a province of Serbia, and Serbia does not currently recognize Kosovo as an independent state. Another point of contention are the pockets of ethnic Serbian minorities in the northern part of Kosovo, while the rest of the country is ethnically Albanian. Violence has taken many forms over the years and has come from both sides, with the most recent incident occurring this summer. Ethnically Albanian town officials were elected to a Serbian-majority area despite a boycott by Serbian civilians, causing a series of violent protests. These protests were a uniquely devastating flare up, warranting international concern over the longevity of the tensions. These tensions, if not resolved, could have significant impacts on each country's chances of gaining European Union membership, something that grows ever more important after Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

The 2013 Brussels Agreement between Serbia and Kosovo mandated the creation of a majority Serbian district with autonomous Serbian leaders. The Kosovar government called for elections in this district in November of 2022 following a mass resignation of Serbian officials. These officials had been influential in preserving the ‘parallel system’, which allows Serbia to maintain an influence on Kosovar government institutions in Serbian-majority districts and protect the majority Serbian population. When the Albanian government called for new elections, the Serbian majority boycotted the elections and only ethnic Albanians voted.  Thus, when Albanian leaders were elected in this district, Serbs living in the North and the Serbian government in Belegarde took issue. Serbians protested the instatement of these elected officials by demonstrating in front of the municipality buildings. They demanded new elections, in which the Serbians would voice their disapproval with Albanians serving in a position of power over the ethnic Serbian majority. After four days, these protests turned violent and garnered varied international response.

France and Germany were quick to call for new elections, saying that elections with less than five percent of the eligible voters was “not a condition of legitimacy”. This was a call for de-escalation, and an attempt to dissuade citizens from violence. Most international responses followed this logic – halting the violence and promoting compromise would be the best route for both countries involved. The United States, France, and other European Union countries have been extremely involved in creating compromises between the two nations, and have urged both leaders to follow the agreements that they previously created.

Neither Serbia nor Kosovo are currently members of the European Union. After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in early 2022, EU membership has become ever more critical to a country’s security, especially in eastern Europe. Serbia has been in talks with the EU about accession to the organization since 2009, but the continuation of violence between Serbia and Kosovo has drawn out the process and ultimately dampened their prospects of membership. Kosovo has not applied for EU membership, and is only partially recognized around the world. Continuing tensions between these two countries vying for international approval – and an unwillingness to adhere to previous agreements – does not bode well for either of their futures. EU membership is vital for smaller countries for security: if one member is attacked, countries could be required to send military aid and assistance. Countries with smaller populations would benefit greatly from the extra assistance. Russia could become a threat to peace in the Western Balkans in the future, and these countries must be prepared in case they need military assistance.  If these two countries cannot put an end to the violence, prospects of either one gaining EU membership for essential security and economic integration purposes will dwindle, leaving them exposed and isolated from the rest of Europe while Russia invades Ukraine less than a thousand kilometers away. The United States and European Union members must continue to urge restraint between Serbia and Kosovo, and attempt to mediate before tensions escalate to a point of no return.