Chaos in ECOWAS and Regionalism’s Regression: America’s Role

By: Wyatt Dayhoff

The Economic Community of West African States, or ECOWAS, was founded in 1975 to advance economic integration across fifteen West African states as they struggled to cope with skyrocketing debt and the enduring legacy of colonialism. When civil wars and political instability hampered its efforts, the organization pivoted to facilitate peace and security in the region. Since then, it has helped end numerous political crises, playing a large role in the region’s complete democratic stability from 2015-2020, and has been hailed as the most successful model of regional governance in Africa.

Then, on January 28th, 2024, three of its founding members declared their resignation from the bloc, sending shockwaves through the organization and the continent as a whole. Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, all engulfed by coups since 2020, blamed the organization for kowtowing to foreign powers and betraying the roots of the organization. 

Why did they leave? All members of the new “Alliance of Sahel States” (AES) had been facing scrutiny, both verbal and economic, of their junta-led regimes from ECOWAS and Western powers prior to their secession. Mali, for example, was slapped with sanctions by the bloc while it endeavored to recover from COVID- and Ukraine-induced shocks, causing devastating inflation and price hikes for basic commodities. These sanctions, in tandem with an apparent failure to prevent terrorism, turned public sentiment against ECOWAS, which is now seen by many as a puppet of the West. The Alliance’s grievances, then, are not surprising, and ECOWAS was unable to negotiate a return to democracy as it had previously done so well. This followed multiple failures to intervene when other West African leaders (Ouattara in Cote D’Ivoire and Conde in Ghana) used manipulative tactics to receive extra terms. 

Even before this landmark event, experts noted that ECOWAS was at a crossroads. Divided and discombobulated, the bloc was hemorrhaging authority and legitimacy. Now, its raison d’etre teeters on the brink: outside of its confines, the organization cannot hope to even attempt to restore democracy to the three nations, much less facilitate trade. The AES will likely suffer, too; on February 19, Niger defaulted up to $520 million in debt, and without access to regional markets the nation will plunge even deeper into economic strife. Sahelian border closures will recreate the very problems that ECOWAS was formed to solve. ECOWAS lifted existing sanctions on February 25th to account for the default, but it still remains unable to provide broader support given Niger’s lack of membership.

The future paints a grim picture for the West African region, reflecting larger concerns about regionalism in developing nations. ASEAN, arguably the most influential regional bloc, was fractured by Myanmar’s 2022 coup and remains paralyzed. Regionalism and multilateralism, concepts that showed such promise in the 2010s, now lay tattered after COVID’s enormous economic and political impact. Instead, neo-Cold War thinking has surged, with countries joining either the Chinese or the Western camp. While China and the United States are working together to create a debt relief package for emerging markets, bandwagoning with one party or the other has become the norm, making aid and support contingent on politics. 

The world can ill afford a continuation of this trend. Democracy has declined precipitously in recent years and remains shaky, economic growth has stagnated in many countries, and global income inequality is at the same levels as the early 20th century. In other words, developing nations are not developing, and the lack of a regionally-based framework for cooperation and resistance to outside pressures certainly adds to the strain. 

While the states of ECOWAS must work better in tandem, the United States has also been complicit in such stagnation, repeatedly burying coalition-led plans in the United Nations and imposing neoliberal economic deregulation that has lowered living standards. In pursuing its own economic interests, America has often neglected the needs of others, and without a profound shift in how it approaches developing nations, it will continue to draw the ire of those it tries to court. 

American partnership, not peonage, is needed. Otherwise, organizations like ECOWAS will continue to falter under adversity because positions taken become attached to big brother. Given its size, it is difficult for America to not loom large and lurk in the back of decision-making. That said, acknowledging that intervention has and continues to fail is needed for American policymakers to help actualize a more inclusive future that benefits both American and its partners. 

Until then, we can only hope that the trust destroyed during the pandemic can be reignited going forward. West Africa has come a long way already, and effective institutions, if maintained, could secure the livelihoods of some of the youngest, fastest-growing populations in the world.

How Nagorno-Karabakh Undermines Western Justifications in Ukraine

By: Danial Butt

The Republic of Artsakh, better known by its Russian name of Nagorno-Karabakh, is a piece of land in the Caucasus that has been disputed by Armenia and Azerbaijan for decades. The vast majority of Nagorno-Karabakh’s population is Armenian, and its people were effectively operating as their own state, wholly autonomous from their neighbors. Due to Soviet imperialist policies, it was considered part of its Azerbaijan region instead of Armenia with arbitrary border lines comparable to that of colonialist regimes. When the Soviet Union collapsed, Nagorno-Karabakh was then recognized by the rest of the world as part of the modern day independent Azerbaijan. But mere recognition in itself is not a legally binding way to determine land claims. Nagorno-Karabakh itself seceded from the Soviet Union to form its own republic in 1991. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan not only claimed the territory for itself but has also been rewriting its history to claim that Armenians are not indigenous to the region but are invaders that need to be expelled. 

Sound familiar? Like Ukraine, Nagorno-Karabakh is a key region in Eastern Europe that is being disputed under the same tactics of historical revisionism and blatant disregard for international laws. While the Western world has very much been invested into the War in Ukraine over the past few years, it has comparatively been uninvolved in protecting the people of Nagorno-Karabakh. Within the past year, Azerbaijan’s offensive effectively expelled over ninety nine percent of the native Armenian population from Nagorno-Karabakh. Various global organizations have labeled this catastrophe as a genocide, perpetuating the legitimacy of “might makes right” policies. Conversely, Western leadership itself has largely ignored if not exacerbated the conflict, selling weapons to the region for decades instead of properly negotiating peace between any of the countries involved. Such actions expose the hypocrisy of the so-called democratic powers, showing how they are only fixated on protecting human rights when they have to protect their own interests.

While the UN offices in Azerbaijan have reported that over 100,000 people fled Nagorno-Karabakh, they also reported that they “saw no damage” present in their investigations. But such claims have been disputed. Notably, Azerbaijan was criticized for obstructing UNESCO investigations into Nagorno-Karabakh. If they truly did “[see] no damage”, then it begs the question: why would Azerbaijan act as if there is anything to hide? With Azerbaijan’s long standing policies of declaring Nagorno-Karabakh as for themselves, there is no doubt that Azerbaijan will take the opportunity to tear down any evidence of Armenian ties to the land.

While it still operated as its own country, Nagorno-Karabakh itself had been relatively prosperous. For example, Nagorno-Karabakh had higher annual wages than Azerbaijan. Unfortunately, it is nigh impossible for such conditions to continue in the region, as Azerbaijan operates under authoritarian rule without free and fair elections. One may have expected Armenia’s ally in Russia to protect their interests and fellow people in Nagorno-Karabakh, but Russian fears of a democracy growing on their doorstep rendered this impossible as Armenian politics have recently transitioned towards Western democracy. Moreover, Russia has instead been galvanizing their diplomatic ties with Azerbaijan and Turkey. Both of these countries have been attempting to take control of the Zangezur Corridor, which goes through Armenia’s Syunik province. The loss of this land would hinder Armenia’s sovereignty even further if not entirely. But even without ownership of the corridor being settled, Armenia has alarmingly been referring to Azerbaijan’s escalating attacks on their borders as a sign of war to come.

It would of course be in the West’s best interest to aid Armenia and the refugees from Nagorno-Karabakh now, but there is a worrying problem that it is too little too late. Ethnic cleansing in Nagorno-Karabakh has already been accomplished with Russia and arguably even UN offices turning a blind eye to it. Continuing to recognize Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan instead of its own country not only served to legitimize the annexation but has effectively signaled that Armenia proper is now ripe for the taking. By this very logic, Palestine and Taiwan can freely be annexed as well as they are not recognized either. Much of Palestine has already been displaced while Taiwan is still in a precarious situation. And of course, Ukraine itself is still in imminent threat of being taken over. Even if Russia does not succeed now, it has already been proven that the West cares about protecting democracy as much as Russia cares about Armenia.

The Dangers of Tunnel Vision: Parsing Taiwanese Democratic Choice

By: Anna Murray

On January 13th, 2024, the Taiwanese public elected Lai Ching-te to serve as their next president, marking the first time in history that the incumbent party in Taiwan has claimed victory with two subsequent different candidates. The victor’s party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), gained international recognition for being the least favorite option for the People’s Republic of China. Lai Ching-te has long expressed intent to strengthen economic relations with the US, continuing efforts made by previous president Tsai Ing-wen to wean Taiwan off of economic dependence on China and establish significant trade relations with regional partners in Southeast Asia and across the Pacific in Europe and the US. Americans concerned with cross-strait affairs felt an overall sense of relief that the Taiwanese public had favored the DPP over the Kuomintang, which on the whole favored better economic relations with the Chinese mainland. 

However, most international observers were surprised by the relative lack of focus on China within this Taiwanese election cycle. Polls and surveys showed that the vast majority of younger and middle-aged Taiwanese voters focused on domestic issues in this election: inflation and job insecurity, housing shortages and wages. At the end of the day, the DPP offered the public a domestic policy package that exceeded the competitors’. To an America that only ever sees Taiwan in the context of the cross-strait conflict, this reality is almost unbelievable. To the average Taiwanese voter, the visible shift to domestic issues is a long time coming.

The first undeniable fact is that the Taiwanese position on China, at least since the advent of the 21st century, has rarely changed. Most Taiwanese individuals highly value the status quo; they do not wish to replicate the “one country, two systems” situation that plagues Hong Kong, but they also do not want the violence and uncertainty that would come with declaring independence. Previous President Tsai Ing-wen faced scalding criticism over her prioritization of independence from China, so much so that Lai Ching-te doubled down on reducing cross-strait tensions as much as possible during his 2024 electoral campaign. Seen time and time again, any politician that attempts to move beyond this status quo is almost immediately discredited in the eyes of the average Taiwanese voter; sharp changes in strategy must invariably be avoided at all costs. As such, in the grand scheme of things, the actual China strategy of the DPP candidate does not vary all that much from the KMT candidate.

Perhaps more importantly, the Taiwanese people are tired of talking about China. For a country that has been talking about and contending with the threat of the PRC for the better half of a century, the fear and uncertainty are commonplace. A professor of mine in Taiwan cautioned us almost immediately against asking locals about the cross-strait issue; though Americans start a discussion on Taiwan with the PRC, it is taboo to discuss on the island itself. The US has only recently reopened the conversation on Taiwan because of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and its implications, but cross-strait relations remained a preoccupation over decades in Taiwan. The China threat is thus a sunk cost in Taiwanese elections; if you’re going to be a politician in Taiwan in this day and age, you must have something else to bring to the table. 

What is left is an intense pride for the type of miracle democracy that Taiwan is; founded out of the ashes of a dictatorship under Chiang Kai-shek and weathered through menacing PLA navy ships at its borders, Taiwanese public participation is as unshakable as ever. It was not until recently that the vast majority of Taiwanese individuals began to identify primarily as Taiwanese; regardless, this individualism has become a crucial part of civic participation and perception of government’s responsibility. Put simply, Taiwanese voters see that there is a lot to Taiwan’s name that does not include the cross-strait crisis, and they expect their government to respond. 

While the DPP may favor economic relations with the United States more than China, it is likely the case that China will not base its decision to act on Taiwan on the outcomes of their elections. No Taiwanese party would wholeheartedly hand the island over to the mainland, and Taiwanese industry is already too dependent on China to make a difference one way or the other. Most past attempts to diversify trading partners have faced extreme difficulty due to Chinese sanctions and diplomatic actions; this is a fact that would likely not alter by administration either. In the end, the Taiwanese story will depend on the Chinese willingness to move from threats to action, and this period of uncertainty could span from tomorrow to never. In the meantime, Taiwan can fight by maintaining a well-coordinated democracy, a strong domestic economy and production capacity, and a steady stream of visiting tourists, students, and dignitaries to drum up support. As a result, domestic policy in the coming years will be more crucial than ever, a conviction this election proves beyond a reasonable doubt.