By: Anna Douglas Piper
Today, the United States and China compete across almost every facet of the global market. Whether surrounding nuclear weapons, Taiwan, or economic relations, nearly every conversation has grown tense. Cooperation has broken down since 2018, largely due to various administrations’ trade wars, specifically the Trump administration’s strategies of hostile engagement.
Attitudes coming from China reflect much of the same hostility. Advocates of aggression have grown stronger – one of the only things Democrats and Republicans agree on today is a tough stance against China. This won’t change on its own, even with the upcoming election.
We must not fall into this trap. A pre-Trump engagement strategy is not only possible, but necessary.
The U.S. must aspire to stabilize the tense relationship and allow conflict resolution. Mutual benefits include addressing shared challenges, like climate change and nuclear proliferation. An engagement strategy aligns with U.S. principles of international cooperation and diplomacy and ensures peace and stability are supported globally.
To examine the effectiveness of engagement in promoting a liberal world order, we can turn to historical experiences with Japan.
The U.S. saw confidence grow under the Bretton Woods System as trade barriers were reduced and Japan experienced rapid growth. As this growth continued into the 1980s, the U.S. began to worry about Japan’s rising influence. Economists warned Congress that Japan would surpass the U.S. in economic size. By 1995, Clinton was taking relations to the brink of a trade war – the U.S. even briefly imposed 25 percent tariffs on luxury vehicles.
A breakdown in cooperation was clear.
Many argue this supports the realist prediction that engagement will fail in the long run. However, U.S.-Japan cooperation in the 1990s continued, countering the realist theory. A 1988 bilateral deal opened Japan’s beef, orange, and cigarette markets to imports, and the collision over automobiles was averted when the U.S. withdrew luxury car tariffs a month later.
Though the end of the twentieth century witnessed international tensions that arguably undermined liberal institutionalism, this tension did not produce a collapse of the international system. Despite tensions with Japan, cooperation remained.
The realist perspective that increasing tensions inevitably lead to trade wars does not always explain how countries will interact. To better understand U.S.-China relations, we can consider the neoliberal institutionalist prediction that countries continue to move to a liberal world order.
Moves like trade restrictions are only a partial solution to combat a rising China. Export controls by the U.S. are unlikely to succeed unless other participating countries do the same, which they won’t do for fear of Chinese retaliation. It seems to be unavoidable that restrictions will either stagnate and dissipate or the two economies will forever be separated — the latter being unrealistic.
The conflict between China and the United States is not inevitable, but depends entirely on the next moves from both sides. It is clear, then, that the U.S. must return to increased engagement with China.
Responses may vary. Countries with close economic relationships with China, including South Korea and Japan, may view engagement positively. However, others with competitive concerns may profit from a limited U.S.-China trade flow. Additionally, regions like Taiwan may not react positively to an apparent U.S. acceptance of China’s policies. While countries may be wary of China’s growing regional influence, increased engagement is more effective than trying to convince them to confront China through other means, given fears of retaliation.
The urgency for renewed engagement is clear. Rising tensions threaten global stability and undermine U.S. efforts to pursue cooperation. Both nations have the opportunity to address pressing challenges, though it remains to be seen how China would respond to such a move. We cannot rely on the upcoming election for a change. The stakes are high, but the attitude that the U.S. adopts creates impacts far beyond the borders of Washington and Beijing.