Mirrored Corruption in Southeast Asia

By: Margaret Jane Piatos

In Southeast Asia, political reform is like a game of musical chairs. In the past year alone, both the Philippines and Indonesia have faced waves of public outrage over corruption and governance failures, and each time, their leaders responded by rearranging it.

In early 2024, the Philippines was submerged: literally and politically. A massive ₱500-billion (US$10.15 billion) flood control program, designed to protect provinces from typhoon damage, became the center of a national scandal after reports revealed that much of the funding had become “ghost projects.” Entire floodwalls existed only on paper, and many communities in Pampanga and Bulacan watched their homes drown again during the rainy season. Days later, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. announced a sweeping cabinet reshuffle, replacing several high-profile leaders in what he called a “renewal of government integrity.” But few believed that new faces meant new ethics. 

The Philippines reshaped nearly every branch of government. The Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) Secretary Manuel Bonoan stepped down amid investigations, replacing former Department of Transportation Secretary Vince Dizon, who swiftly demanded courtesy resignations from senior officials and filed graft complaints against implicated contractors.

The Senate, too, saw upheaval. Francis “Chiz” Escudero was ousted as Senate President, accused of delaying impeachment proceedings and linked to firms that profited from flood projects, and Vincent “Tito” Sotto III reclaimed the presidency. In the House of Representatives, Speaker Martin Romualdez, a cousin of the president, resigned following allegations of budget insertions, succeeded by Faustino “Bojie” Dy, who vowed “zero tolerance” for corruption. 

To many Filipinos, this felt more like repositioning than reform. The symbolism was clear: in a country where corruption routinely erodes public trust, reshuffling the cabinet may avoid the headlines, but it cannot rebuild the foundations of integrity. 

Across the sea, Indonesia was living through its own spectacle. In October of 2025, mass protests erupted across Jakarta, Surabaya, and Yogyakarta after police killed a motorcycle taxi driver during a labor demonstration. The protests, initially about police brutality, soon grew into a broader indictment of corruption and elite privilege. Lawmakers’ generous housing allowances, rising food prices, and the widening gap between politicians and citizens fueled resentment. Just a week later, President Prabowo Subianto unveiled his second major cabinet reshuffle since taking office. 

Purbaya Yudhi Sadewa, former head of the Deposit Insurance Corporation, became Finance Minister. Djamari Chaniago replaced Budi Gunawan as Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs. The Minister of Youth and Sports, Dito Ariotedgo, was replaced by Erick Thohir, a businessman and former Minister of State-Owned Enterprises. President Prabowo also announced a new Hajj and Umrah Ministry, expanding what he called the “Merah Putih Cabinet,” although it had the opposite effect.

Indonesians were unconvinced. For many, the reshuffle symbolized not renewal, but repetition, not addressing the public’s demands. Instead of reform, it appeared to be a disguise to project control while preserving political loyalty: the same robust networks, merely rearranged.

Both Prabowo and Marcos rely on reshuffling as a political strategy rather than a governance tool. It suggests responsiveness, even if nothing changes beneath the surface. What makes this cycle so dangerous is not merely the corruption itself, but the illusion of progress it sustains. Each reshuffle is framed as a cleansing measure, yet it reinforces the same networks of patronage and elite exchange that enabled the corruption to begin with. 

This illusion of reform carries beyond politics. Foreign and domestic confidence wavers as fiscal accountability weakens. Inequality deepens when funds intended for infrastructure or welfare are diverted into private interests. Most dangerously, public cynicism grows. The more leaders rely on reshuffles to manage outrage, the more fragile their democracies become. 

In this way, the Philippines and Indonesia are mirror images of one another: vibrant democracies on paper, but systems still driven by personal loyalty and patronage. Each government appointment rewards alliances, and each scandal threatens them. But corruption is not just tolerated; it becomes institutionalized. Until they stop playing musical chairs, every promise of reform will sound the same.

Boat Strikes Make Everyone Less Safe

By: Saira Uttamchandani

Since September, the United States has attacked several boats off the coast of Venezuela that were allegedly carrying illegal drugs into the United States, killing tens of people in the process. The Trump administration has defended these actions, asserting that “[e]ach boat that we sink carries drugs that would kill more than twenty-five thousand Americans,” and that they will “blow [drug smugglers] out of existence.”

These attacks reflect a dubious interpretation of international law with possible significant geopolitical and legal consequences.

While the first strike was carried out in early September, the administration has laid the foundation for these attacks since the President assumed office in January.

On Inauguration Day, President Trump signed an executive order that allowed for drug cartels and criminal organizations to be classified as “foreign terrorist organizations.” This classification has historically been reserved for politically violent organizations such as ISIS and al-Qa’ida. Drugs and border security were critical issues in President Trump’s campaign, and are at the forefront in the minds of Americans. Still, the actions being taken by this administration to address these issues are irresponsible. 

In February, eight cartels in Latin America were classified as “foreign terrorist organizations,” including Tren de Aragua (TDA), a Venezuelan street gang, and in August, the United States deployed missile destroyers off the coast of Venezuela in a more concerted effort to deter Latin American drug cartels.

The White House has also asserted that President Maduro of Venezuela is working with Tren de Aragua members to spread drugs and crime in the United States, even though an April 2025 memorandum from the National Intelligence Council asserts that “the Maduro regime probably does not have a policy of cooperating with TDA and is not directing TDA movement to and operations in the United States.”

As a result, the White House has deported several reported Tren de Aragua members, arguably without due process, and increased the bounty that was on Maduro for previous narcoterrorism charges.

Several possible international law violations may be associated with these attacks.

One example is that engaging in these activities in Venezuela’s territory is a violation of its sovereignty, which deems the United States’ actions “internationally wrongful,” according to the United Nations’ Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts.

These attacks could also be considered an interference with a nation’s sovereignty, because they interfere with Venezuela’s “inherently sovereign functions,” such as law enforcement. The United States’ destruction of evidence of drugs and related evidence directly interferes with Venezuela’s ability to serve as law enforcement in these cases. Ultimately, this may harm America’s interests by inhibiting or disincentivizing the local prosecution of drug smugglers in their country of origin.

Another potentially applicable international law violation is wrongful intervention in Venezuela’s internal affairs. To be considered wrongful intervention, the operation(s) in question must involve coercive interference with the domaine réservé, which is essentially the “internal or domestic affairs of a State.”

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled in Nicaragua v. United States in 1986 that “the element of coercion, which defines, and indeed forms the very essence of, prohibited intervention, is particularly obvious in the case of an intervention which uses force,” which is the case here. Regarding the domaine réservé interference, serving as a law enforcement force via deadly attacks, the United States interferes with Venezuela’s internal or domestic affairs.

For such attacks to be considered self-defense, which is what the Trump administration has asserted that they are, Article 51 of the United Nations Charter specifies that a state has the right to defend itself in the case of an “armed attack.”

This raises several concerns. First, there are many steps involved in producing and smuggling drugs. This longer causal chain and period of time between actions weaken the case that this can be considered an armed attack.

Second, the ICJ implied in the majority view of Nicaragua that armed attacks are only “the most grave forms of the use of force.” While drug trafficking is terrible, it is hard to imagine that it reaches this high threshold.

This weakening of international law has several implications. For one, it raises questions about the actions of other nations. The United States plays a significant role in global affairs, and its disregard for international law may send a message to other countries that it is acceptable for them to do the same, making the world less safe.

Additionally, the buildup to these attacks, including the reclassification of TDA, deportations, and an increased bounty on President Maduro, raises concerns that the US could be perceived as trying to justify a political war under the guise of an invasion. Secretary of State Marco Rubio added to this perception by saying the President “wants to wage war on these groups” and previously claiming that “Venezuela and the Maduro regime has become a threat to the region and even to the United States.” 

These extrajudicial attacks by the US open the door to greater future possibilities of lawlessness in other Latin American countries, if Latin American countries follow this American example.

There are also domestic concerns that the US is using Venezuela to justify actions within the United States, like deportations without due process. More broadly, it can be seen as part of a pattern of actions that stretches the perimeter of executive action well beyond what is considered acceptable by most legal scholars. These actions include the recent deployment of the National Guard in Los Angeles. There are similar themes of violated sovereignty, and the actions taken with Venezuela do not inspire confidence that the current administration will honor this sovereignty. It could continue deploying the National Guard in cities across the United States.

The administration’s actions, at best, stretch the boundaries of several aspects of international law, and at worst, are a flagrant violation. This disregard for international law spells out dangerous consequences for Americans and foreigners alike.

The Cost of Exclusion: How H-1B Visa Policy Changes Threaten U.S. Innovation and Security

By: Céleste Wetmore

The United States is no stranger to a competition. Throughout the second half of the 20th century, Americans faced a nuclear arms race with the Soviet Union. Today, the U.S. competes neck-to-neck with China in a technology race equally essential to national security. In this race, the U.S. federal government relies on the private sector’s success, investing billions to integrate private sector tech solutions into intelligence and national security efforts, therefore developing a dependence on private sector strategies. However, the Trump administration’s recent changes to the H-1B visa acquisition process could jeopardize the very individuals needed to protect our national security.

The H-1B visa program connects specially skilled foreign applicants with American employers “who cannot otherwise obtain needed abilities from the U.S. workforce” by authorizing the temporary employment of qualified individuals not otherwise authorized to work in the United States. The program is heavily used, particularly in the science, technology, engineering and math (STEM) fields. In fiscal year (FY) 2024, 65 percent of the 400,000 approved applications were renewals, illustrating the private sector’s continuous reliance on individuals working under an H-1B visa.

Throwing a wedge into this process, President Trump recently announced a new $100,000 fee on H-1B visa petitions. Following the policy’s effective date on September 21, 2025, employers looking to hire new H-1B applicants are now required to pay this amount before continuing the petition process. The Trump administration hopes this move will incentivize private companies to hire out of the American applicant pool. However, the Trump administration has failed to consider the policy’s troubling implications given the current context.

The Trump administration’s actions disrupt a private sector that is paramount to national security efforts and built with contribution from foreign talent accessed through the H-1B visa. The COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated the critical importance of H-1B workers in responding to national emergencies. For instance, between FY 2010 and FY 2019, eight U.S. companies that helped develop the COVID-19 vaccine received H-1B approvals for 3,310 biochemists, biophysicists, chemists, and other scientists.

At this moment,  the Trump administration should be attracting talent, not chasing it away. Where the COVID-19 pandemic was unexpected, the global technology race is publicly and rapidly gaining momentum, especially with the Artificial Intelligence movement.  While both nations are superpowers, the U.S. holds a unique edge: massive private investment in a variety of industries, including recent AI development, an amount nearly 12 times that of China in 2024.  In FY 2025, Meta, Microsoft, and Amazon were top employers of H-1B visa holders, companies projected to invest 240 billion into AI development by the end of 2025.  Historically, the US has excelled at attracting top STEM talent from abroad, while China has struggled to do so. However, his policy change could push international talent back to the East. In FY 2023, Indian nationals accounted for 73 percent of approved H-1B visas, with Chinese nationals a distant second at 11.7 percent. China produced 47 percent of the top AI talent in 2022, far surpassing the United States at second place with 18 percent. With an increasingly competitive American visa process, however, Indian and Chinese talent is likely to deflect into Chinese research and development (R&D) efforts, giving critical advantage to a major U.S. adversary.

Republicans argue that companies take advantage of H-1B visa workers: paying foreigners less than Americans to save profits, therefore disadvantaging American applicants and the national economy. Following this logic, targeting companies with extra costs should force executives to reevaluate the benefits of supporting H-1B recipients and refocus on American talent. While this argument for the administration’s new policy holds a legal basis, the U.S. government is responsible for holistically evaluating the effects of their policies. This responsibility is further augmented when federal national security efforts are in danger of extensive indirect impact.

Whether the static dynamic aligns with the Trump administration’s political agenda or not, the reality is that the private sector operates with a dependence on foreign workers. The $100,000 fee is a crude fix—forcing key R&D companies to drastically shift their workforce over the next year will take funding and focus away from crucial R&D initiatives. Projects will be disrupted, potentially exposing vulnerabilities within U.S. national security. Even worse, the foreign talent driving America’s tech edge will funnel to other countries. The U.S. currently leads private enterprise in AI innovation, but China is undoubtedly its primary technological rival. With Indian and Chinese nationals accounting for over 80% of H-1B visa holders, restricting their entry risks diverting world-class talent toward Beijing instead.

Now is hardly the time to clog the international talent pipeline and disturb the delicate private-public exchange that keeps the U.S. ahead of China. If the Trump administration is desperate to address abuse of the H-1B visa, it must conduct triage: employ a delicate, calculated approach to extend support to impacted companies currently reckoning with these workforce changes.