Trump's Contradictory Stance on Foreign Policy

By: Jacob Rabin

For better or for worse, the early days of President Trump’s second term have consisted of an intense shakeup of the United States’ foreign policy priorities. Although some of the administration’s measures are still pending legal challenges, widespread actions including vast trade deals, foreign aid cuts, and tariffs have rattled the international status quo.

Trump has sought to claw back at least $8 billion previously allotted for foreign aid. He also blocked another $4.9 billion in aid approved by Congress already. His administration has claimed to have reached trade deals with dozens of countries, although the number of finalized agreements likely remains in the single digits. Trump has imposed some level of tariffs on nearly all nations, although it has been tough to decipher exactly how many countries are affected and at what level. Either way, he has moved beyond the handful of trade disputes typical of recent administrations and instead initiated a near-global tariff regime.

The most fascinating parts of Trump’s decisions are the actions directed at our long term allies, namely Canada and the United Kingdom. Canada alone accounts for roughly $762 billion in annual trade with the United States, including nearly $350 billion in American exports and $28 billion in agricultural goods. The United Kingdom absorbs about $85 billion in U.S. exports each year. Yet, both countries, who have long been integral security and economic partners, have been publicly scolded for unfair trade and subjected to new tariff frameworks. Trump’s complex web of tariffs on British and Canadian goods, among others, has already raised prices for key sectors of the economy like aluminum, autos, and machinery.

But amidst these widespread changes, one nation has been on the receiving end of American generosity and aid: Argentina. On October 9th, the U.S. announced an agreement with Argentina to provide a $20 billion currency swap lifeline to Argentina to prevent a collapse of the peso, which would have triggered widespread economic distress. This investment was followed just a few days later by another $20 billion, reportedly focused on the debt market. This move was catalyzed by the Trump administration but is to be funded by private actors and sovereign funds. Additionally, in July the Trump administration announced they were working on a plan to reinstate visa-free travel for Argentine passport holders, a strong diplomatic gesture. 

All of this for what? Just $16.5 billion in exports? When compared to the $350 billion in goods sent to Canada, it is clear that these are not economic decisions; they are ideological ones. Trump has called Argentina’s conservative leader, Javier Milei, his “favorite president” and the timing of the aforementioned financial bailout, just days before Argentina’s October 26 legislative elections, was unmistakable. The goal of these actions was immediately clear. Trump wanted to prop up Milei’s conservative party rather than risk losing ground to the left-leaning Peronist opposition movement.

This aid has come at the expense of Americans, many of whom have been longtime supporters of Trump. The beef industry has been hit particularly hard. Senator Fischer, a Republican from Nebraska who has supported Trump on nearly everything urged the administration to prioritize America’s ranchers. She warned, warned that Trump's policies are not “the way” to address rising beef prices; she asserts that government intervention in the beef market will hurt cattle ranchers and urges the Trump administration to “focus on trade deals that benefit [American] [agricultural] producers” rather than “imports that will do more harm than good.” Justin Tupper, the President of the United States Cattlemen's Association went further, saying, “A deal of this magnitude with Argentina would undercut the very foundation of our cattle industry.” 

Other Republicans were critical, or at the very least skeptical. Josh Hawley, a Republican senator from Missouri said, “My intuitive response to bailouts in general, whether talking about bank executives or foreign countries, is to be very skeptical.” In fact, 48% of Trump voters expressed disapproval of the net $40 billion package for Argentina.

Trump’s foreign policy decisions make little sense currently, but this isn’t a new revelation. People far smarter than me have been making this argument since day one. However, we must continue to ask why. Americans deserve to know why their government is underwriting the success of a foreign leader while farmers and manufacturers at home face rising costs and shrinking markets. Asking that question isn’t disloyal—it’s patriotic. In the end, holding our government accountable is far more American than bailing out a far-right ruler half a world away.

Mirrored Corruption in Southeast Asia

By: Margaret Jane Piatos

In Southeast Asia, political reform is like a game of musical chairs. In the past year alone, both the Philippines and Indonesia have faced waves of public outrage over corruption and governance failures, and each time, their leaders responded by rearranging it.

In early 2024, the Philippines was submerged: literally and politically. A massive ₱500-billion (US$10.15 billion) flood control program, designed to protect provinces from typhoon damage, became the center of a national scandal after reports revealed that much of the funding had become “ghost projects.” Entire floodwalls existed only on paper, and many communities in Pampanga and Bulacan watched their homes drown again during the rainy season. Days later, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. announced a sweeping cabinet reshuffle, replacing several high-profile leaders in what he called a “renewal of government integrity.” But few believed that new faces meant new ethics. 

The Philippines reshaped nearly every branch of government. The Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) Secretary Manuel Bonoan stepped down amid investigations, replacing former Department of Transportation Secretary Vince Dizon, who swiftly demanded courtesy resignations from senior officials and filed graft complaints against implicated contractors.

The Senate, too, saw upheaval. Francis “Chiz” Escudero was ousted as Senate President, accused of delaying impeachment proceedings and linked to firms that profited from flood projects, and Vincent “Tito” Sotto III reclaimed the presidency. In the House of Representatives, Speaker Martin Romualdez, a cousin of the president, resigned following allegations of budget insertions, succeeded by Faustino “Bojie” Dy, who vowed “zero tolerance” for corruption. 

To many Filipinos, this felt more like repositioning than reform. The symbolism was clear: in a country where corruption routinely erodes public trust, reshuffling the cabinet may avoid the headlines, but it cannot rebuild the foundations of integrity. 

Across the sea, Indonesia was living through its own spectacle. In October of 2025, mass protests erupted across Jakarta, Surabaya, and Yogyakarta after police killed a motorcycle taxi driver during a labor demonstration. The protests, initially about police brutality, soon grew into a broader indictment of corruption and elite privilege. Lawmakers’ generous housing allowances, rising food prices, and the widening gap between politicians and citizens fueled resentment. Just a week later, President Prabowo Subianto unveiled his second major cabinet reshuffle since taking office. 

Purbaya Yudhi Sadewa, former head of the Deposit Insurance Corporation, became Finance Minister. Djamari Chaniago replaced Budi Gunawan as Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs. The Minister of Youth and Sports, Dito Ariotedgo, was replaced by Erick Thohir, a businessman and former Minister of State-Owned Enterprises. President Prabowo also announced a new Hajj and Umrah Ministry, expanding what he called the “Merah Putih Cabinet,” although it had the opposite effect.

Indonesians were unconvinced. For many, the reshuffle symbolized not renewal, but repetition, not addressing the public’s demands. Instead of reform, it appeared to be a disguise to project control while preserving political loyalty: the same robust networks, merely rearranged.

Both Prabowo and Marcos rely on reshuffling as a political strategy rather than a governance tool. It suggests responsiveness, even if nothing changes beneath the surface. What makes this cycle so dangerous is not merely the corruption itself, but the illusion of progress it sustains. Each reshuffle is framed as a cleansing measure, yet it reinforces the same networks of patronage and elite exchange that enabled the corruption to begin with. 

This illusion of reform carries beyond politics. Foreign and domestic confidence wavers as fiscal accountability weakens. Inequality deepens when funds intended for infrastructure or welfare are diverted into private interests. Most dangerously, public cynicism grows. The more leaders rely on reshuffles to manage outrage, the more fragile their democracies become. 

In this way, the Philippines and Indonesia are mirror images of one another: vibrant democracies on paper, but systems still driven by personal loyalty and patronage. Each government appointment rewards alliances, and each scandal threatens them. But corruption is not just tolerated; it becomes institutionalized. Until they stop playing musical chairs, every promise of reform will sound the same.

Boat Strikes Make Everyone Less Safe

By: Saira Uttamchandani

Since September, the United States has attacked several boats off the coast of Venezuela that were allegedly carrying illegal drugs into the United States, killing tens of people in the process. The Trump administration has defended these actions, asserting that “[e]ach boat that we sink carries drugs that would kill more than twenty-five thousand Americans,” and that they will “blow [drug smugglers] out of existence.”

These attacks reflect a dubious interpretation of international law with possible significant geopolitical and legal consequences.

While the first strike was carried out in early September, the administration has laid the foundation for these attacks since the President assumed office in January.

On Inauguration Day, President Trump signed an executive order that allowed for drug cartels and criminal organizations to be classified as “foreign terrorist organizations.” This classification has historically been reserved for politically violent organizations such as ISIS and al-Qa’ida. Drugs and border security were critical issues in President Trump’s campaign, and are at the forefront in the minds of Americans. Still, the actions being taken by this administration to address these issues are irresponsible. 

In February, eight cartels in Latin America were classified as “foreign terrorist organizations,” including Tren de Aragua (TDA), a Venezuelan street gang, and in August, the United States deployed missile destroyers off the coast of Venezuela in a more concerted effort to deter Latin American drug cartels.

The White House has also asserted that President Maduro of Venezuela is working with Tren de Aragua members to spread drugs and crime in the United States, even though an April 2025 memorandum from the National Intelligence Council asserts that “the Maduro regime probably does not have a policy of cooperating with TDA and is not directing TDA movement to and operations in the United States.”

As a result, the White House has deported several reported Tren de Aragua members, arguably without due process, and increased the bounty that was on Maduro for previous narcoterrorism charges.

Several possible international law violations may be associated with these attacks.

One example is that engaging in these activities in Venezuela’s territory is a violation of its sovereignty, which deems the United States’ actions “internationally wrongful,” according to the United Nations’ Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts.

These attacks could also be considered an interference with a nation’s sovereignty, because they interfere with Venezuela’s “inherently sovereign functions,” such as law enforcement. The United States’ destruction of evidence of drugs and related evidence directly interferes with Venezuela’s ability to serve as law enforcement in these cases. Ultimately, this may harm America’s interests by inhibiting or disincentivizing the local prosecution of drug smugglers in their country of origin.

Another potentially applicable international law violation is wrongful intervention in Venezuela’s internal affairs. To be considered wrongful intervention, the operation(s) in question must involve coercive interference with the domaine réservé, which is essentially the “internal or domestic affairs of a State.”

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled in Nicaragua v. United States in 1986 that “the element of coercion, which defines, and indeed forms the very essence of, prohibited intervention, is particularly obvious in the case of an intervention which uses force,” which is the case here. Regarding the domaine réservé interference, serving as a law enforcement force via deadly attacks, the United States interferes with Venezuela’s internal or domestic affairs.

For such attacks to be considered self-defense, which is what the Trump administration has asserted that they are, Article 51 of the United Nations Charter specifies that a state has the right to defend itself in the case of an “armed attack.”

This raises several concerns. First, there are many steps involved in producing and smuggling drugs. This longer causal chain and period of time between actions weaken the case that this can be considered an armed attack.

Second, the ICJ implied in the majority view of Nicaragua that armed attacks are only “the most grave forms of the use of force.” While drug trafficking is terrible, it is hard to imagine that it reaches this high threshold.

This weakening of international law has several implications. For one, it raises questions about the actions of other nations. The United States plays a significant role in global affairs, and its disregard for international law may send a message to other countries that it is acceptable for them to do the same, making the world less safe.

Additionally, the buildup to these attacks, including the reclassification of TDA, deportations, and an increased bounty on President Maduro, raises concerns that the US could be perceived as trying to justify a political war under the guise of an invasion. Secretary of State Marco Rubio added to this perception by saying the President “wants to wage war on these groups” and previously claiming that “Venezuela and the Maduro regime has become a threat to the region and even to the United States.” 

These extrajudicial attacks by the US open the door to greater future possibilities of lawlessness in other Latin American countries, if Latin American countries follow this American example.

There are also domestic concerns that the US is using Venezuela to justify actions within the United States, like deportations without due process. More broadly, it can be seen as part of a pattern of actions that stretches the perimeter of executive action well beyond what is considered acceptable by most legal scholars. These actions include the recent deployment of the National Guard in Los Angeles. There are similar themes of violated sovereignty, and the actions taken with Venezuela do not inspire confidence that the current administration will honor this sovereignty. It could continue deploying the National Guard in cities across the United States.

The administration’s actions, at best, stretch the boundaries of several aspects of international law, and at worst, are a flagrant violation. This disregard for international law spells out dangerous consequences for Americans and foreigners alike.