By: David Ball
November 19th, 2024
U.S. foreign policy stands at a precipice in shaping its nuclear doctrine for the 21st century. Instability has driven some countries to consider the atomic bomb, while others race to expand their nuclear arsenals. By the end of the decade, China is estimated to have over 1,000 operational nuclear warheads. Meanwhile, other states are scrambling to safeguard themselves against nuclear threats and global instability, as once-strong alliances and long standing commitments are showing signs of faltering.
In 2026, the last nuclear doctrine limiting atomic weapon production between the US and Russia will expire, and it is unlikely to be reinstated. Following the fear of a Ukrainian counterattack in October 2022, the White House was briefed that there were conversations about Russia deploying nuclear weapons in Ukraine. These instances signify a change in nuclear deterrence.
It is increasingly clear that the U.S. is confronting a multipolar world in terms of nuclear strategy. As NATO faces unprecedented tests and global instability worsens, a new arms race is emerging. To address its changing nuclear position, the U.S. must focus on renewed assurances of diplomacy with its allies.
South Korea, one of the United States' key allies, stands at the forefront of this nuclear change. In recent months, its primary geopolitical adversary, North Korea, has recently begun rapidly expanding its nuclear capabilities and has been escalating the rhetoric around using nuclear options. The nuclear question has been a topic of intense debate in South Korea since the 1970s, when the US first announced that they would be moving troops away from the peninsula, but this moment comes at a more tumultuous time.
Not only does North Korea have operational nuclear weapons, but heightened tensions between North and South Korea, uncertainty surrounding the strength of the U.S.-ROK alliance, and North Korea’s closer ties with Russia have created a volatile geopolitical landscape. Notably, 70% of South Koreans believe that its government should develop its own nuclear weapon capability. It is clear that these developments illuminate the need for increased diplomacy to protect our allies and uphold global nuclear nonproliferation efforts.
This increasing weariness of the ROK’s favorability to develop a nuclear weapon has not gone unnoticed. In July of this year, the Biden administration signed a bilateral agreement with the ROK on a joint nuclear deterrence guideline. While the specifics of this agreement remain classified, it was indicated that it would involve the commitment of U.S. nuclear weapons on assignment in South Korea, which allows for the U.S. to respond to a threat quickly, but without having to change its nuclear stance. While this represents a step toward an increased engagement in diplomacy, gaps remain. Defense officials, academics and other influential policymakers within South Korea are both doubtful that the guideline will survive into the coming years, and are stressing the importance of building a more concrete relationship from this guideline.
By implementing and improving on the guidelines signed in its nuclear doctrine, South Korea can be a critical example of how to strengthen the U.S. nuclear umbrella without resorting to nuclear weapons testing. A detailed implementation roadmap that includes regular military exercises and bolstered diplomatic and military ties between South Korea and the United States could help promote deterrence and peace through strength, and reassure U.S. allies internationally of its nuclear umbrella.
Military nuclear exercises have already been held in South Korea, meaning that regular exercises can be possible, as the infrastructure and diplomatic cooperation already exist. Not only would this deter the DPRK, it would also help illustrate the commitment the U.S. has to its other allies that are threatened by the nuclear question, boosting nuclear proliferation and stability for all.
